After a long dormant period, Lower Sixth Avenue in New York has undergone a rapid revitalisation. We show that a simple search theoretic model with information spillovers can explain both the period of underuse and the rapid turnaround. The model reduces to a simple equation, which allows us to do comparative statics on the duration of vacancies. We show how the solution reacts to changes in market structure and changes in search technology. The model is suggestive of dif®culties that may occur in many markets in which there are changes over time in the optimal use of resources.
At one time Lower Sixth Avenue was one of the most fashionable retail centres in Manhattan, but the area collapsed as a retail centre when the af¯uent moved further uptown and to the suburbs. Today, Sixth Avenue is in the midst of a rapid turnaround, as reported in the Sunday New York Times by Claudia Deutsch (June 27, 1993):
After decades of catering to virtually no one save the odd buyer of a quick lunch or piece of hardware, part of that once fashionable strip F F F is again turning into a major retail area.
How can we account for the revitalisation of this depressed area in the middle of a recession?
The New York Times article provides an important clue. In 1992, Bed Bath & Beyond opened Manhattan's ®rst superstore in this area. It was the success of this store that prompted other stores to move to the area. One local businessman is quoted as stating that,`Sixth Avenue was dead as a doornail before, but Bed Bath & Beyond has really opened it up,' while another asserts that,`It was Bed Bath & Beyond that really legitimised the neighborhood.' The article goes on to point out that the arrival of the store changed local rents:`Bed Bath & Beyond is said to be paying in the low $20's a square foot. Barnes and Noble will be paying in the $30's. Current negotiations in the area are inching towards $40. ' There are two features of the Sixth Avenue experience that we wish to explain. The ®rst is the long period of under-use, and the second is the rapid rise in the area's prospects following the arrival and success of the ®rst superstore. In this paper we develop a search model to explore one possible explanation for these events: information externalities. Before Bed Bath & Beyond set up shop, all potential tenants faced the common problem of assessing whether or not New Yorkers would be willing to shop on Lower Sixth Avenue, which is a rather inconvenient location. The size of the crowds at Bed Bath & Beyond demonstrated to other retailers that many shoppers were indeed willing to make the trip. This knowledge led to the snowball effect as other tenants rushed to lease in the area.
We show that our search theoretic model with information spillovers can indeed explain both the long vacant period and the rise in rents following the success of Bed Bath & Beyond. One important feature of the model is that the delay until ®rst occupancy is suboptimally long. This is due to the information externality. When deciding whether or not to accept a tenant, owners do not take into account the value to others of the information revealed in their match and are therefore too selective in equilibrium. The model shows that the failure of optimality may be extreme. We provide examples in which social optimality demands immediate occupancy, but the market produces an arbitrarily long delay.
Another possible explanation for the sudden change in fortunes on Sixth Avenue is a crowd externality, in which later arrivals rushed in to take advantage of the crowds generated by Bed Bath & Beyond.
1 In this paper we also incorporate crowd externalities in the search model, and show that they differ in important ways from information externalities. In particular, in the crowd story the desire of one agent to locate increases the desire of others to locate and bene®t from the crowds. Actions are strategic complements. In the information story the desire of one agent to locate increases the incentive for others to wait and learn from this initial decision so that actions are strategic substitutes.
We believe that our information externality story ®ts the facts of Sixth Avenue better than a crowd story. One reason for this is that Bed Bath & Beyond succeeded before any other stores located in the area. It follows that Bed Bath & Beyond was not in need of external economies in order to be pro®table. A second factor is the striking increase in rents that occurred in the two year period after Bed Bath & Beyond arrived. Rents rose almost 100% over this period, which is hard to understand unless the information upon which rents were based had changed.
2 A third argument in favour of the information story is that the crowds are not all that large in comparison to other retail districts in New York nor are the spillovers obvious. The shopping area extends only four blocks and has stores as diverse as Bed Bath & Beyond, Barnes and Nobles, Tri-City Camera, Staples, TJMaxx, and Today's Man. It is not clear that towels, books, cameras, of®ce supplies and clothes are natural complements.
A ®nal point favouring the informational interpretation is the timing of subsequent lease signings. The stores that followed Bed Bath & Beyond on Sixth Avenue apparently signed their leases after Bed Bath & Beyond had demonstrated success. The simplest agglomeration story would say that Bed 1 The crowd externality story is implicit in many models of strategic complementarity, and is discussed in detail by Rauch (1993) in the context of shopping malls.
2 It may be possible to develop a monopoly version of the crowd externality in which the ®rst tenant gets a low rent in order to attract future tenants. Monopoly ownership, however, appears extremely unlikely in Manhattan.
Bath & Beyond would only have needed to sign a lease in order to prompt others who were already searching to follow suit.
So what is the information that was revealed? In the New York Times article, a local retail broker clearly states that there was scepticism concerning shoppers' willingness to return to Sixth Avenue:
Let's face it, on a sunny afternoon Fifth Avenue is bustling and Sixth is deserted. Who knows to what extent bargain hunters will seek bargains that cost a $20 round trip?
Sixth Avenue is in a rather inconvenient location. There is little parking. There is no subway. There are few residential highrises. New York city is already a congested, competitive market, so the lure of variety and value that makes stores like Bed Bath & Beyond so successful in the suburbs is not necessarily an attraction in New York. There was legitimate reason to doubt that large discount stores would succeed in the area. When the store succeeded, other stores, such as Barnes and Noble, that had previously taken a wait and see attitude, decided that Sixth Avenue was a good place to do business. 
Relation to Literature
Our model contributes to the understanding of information externalities, which can be viewed more generally as examples of the private supply of a public good. Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, et al. (1992) showed how information externalities give rise to herding; the information that agents learn from observing the actions of others may lead them to ignore their own private information. Rob (1991) , Caplin and Leahy (1993a; 1994a), and Chamley and Gale (1994) showed how information externalities may cause agents to delay action inef®ciently, since there is an incentive to wait for others to take costly action. All of the above models are set in the context of irreversible investment decisions, as opposed to the search theoretic setting of this paper.
We believe that search is the most natural setting for an analysis of information externalities. 4 Whenever agents engage in the purposive search for information, their search behaviour will be greatly affected by what they can learn from the actions of other agents. Information externalities will not only result in herding and delays, but will also change the nature of the information that the economic system will end up gathering and incorporating in equilibrium.
Another valuable feature of the search setting is that it provides by far the simplest and most¯exible framework for analysing information externalities. The model boils down to one equation with one endogenous variable, and this equation is easily amended to allow for variations in the market structure.
We believe that the insights of this model have applications to many different economic settings. Caplin and Leahy (1994b) use the model to study the natural rate of unemployment. They consider the search decision of a group of workers who are simultaneously laid off from their jobs, and show that the presence of information spillovers raises the level of search unemployment. Huang and Shirai (1994) have used it to analyse foreign direct investment into China. They show that search externalities may explain the timing and magnitude of entry into that market. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Davis et al. (1994) suggest a role for search and information externalities in their analysis of labour and capital reallocation among manufacturing plants in the United States.
The Model
The basic idea is as follows. The vacant buildings on Sixth Avenue can be seen as options available for a wide variety of alternative uses. Committing a vacant unit to any one of its possible uses is costly to the owner, since such a committment will normally involve modifying the unit to ®t the needs of the particular tenant. If owners can learn about the best use for their property from the experience of neighbouring properties, then they will have an incentive to delay renting. They will all play a waiting game, hoping that one of the other owners will be ®rst to commit their property to a particular use and thereby generate the socially valuable information concerning whether or not the property is well matched to that use. Once a successful use is found the uncommitted owners will be able to use the information to improve the quality of their decisions.
To model the phenomenon of interest, we begin with a set of N identical vacant buildings, each with a distinct owner. We assume that there are two potential uses for each property, which we shall refer to as retail and of®ce space. Owners must decide for which use their property is best suited. We assume that the payoff to using a building as of®ce space is known and equal to W . 0. The value of using a building as retail is unknown and potentially greater. We use a search methodology to capture the time it takes for an owner to identify an appropriate retail tenant.
Each period owners make a series of decisions. First, each landlord decides whether or not to commit their building to of®ce space and collect W or to search for a retail tenant. Each landlord that decides to search then meets a single potential retail tenant. These landlords then simultaneously and independently decide whether or not to offer these tenants leases. The tenants that are offered leases then occupy their buildings and the next period begins. To
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capture the cost of adapting a building to different uses, we make the extreme assumption that such transfers are impossible. Once a building is committed to of®ce space or a retail lease is signed the building is committed to that use and tenant forever. This will mean that it will often be preferable to keep a unit vacant rather than commit it to an incorrect use. We assume that both landlords and tenants are risk neutral and make their decisions to maximise the present value of pro®ts, and that landlords discount future periods by ä P (0, 1). The decisions that landlords make will, of course, depend on the payoffs to retail, the nature of the information process, and the bargaining between landlord and tenant. We now turn to these issues in turn.
The present value of leasing a building to a particular tenant depends on two factors. The ®rst is the quality of the tenant which we denote by á. The second is the quality of the retail market which we denote by ë. For simplicity, we set the total value generated by a match equal to the product of these two factors áë. Note that á is particular to an individual landlord-tenant match, whereas ë is characteristic of the market as a whole and therefore common to all matches. It is the desire to learn about ë that provides an incentive for landlords to learn from the experience of others.
5
As concerns the bargaining problem between landlord and tenant, we assume that landlords can make take it or leave it offers. This means that landlords will extract all of the surplus from the match, and that tenants will pay the expected value of áë at the time of the lease. Placing all of the market power in the landlord's hands removes the potential externality arising from a division of the surplus and allows us to focus on the effect of information spillovers.
The heart of the model lies in the information structure. We assume that tenants are identical ex ante and that all landlords and tenants have identical priors concerning the distributions of á and ë. We assume each á is drawn independently from a uniform distribution on [0, 1] and is revealed to both the tenant and the owner when they meet and before a lease is signed. The critical assumption is that information concerning ë can only be released once a tenant occupies a building and that tenant's success can be judged. Initially, all agents know that ë is distributed uniformly on [0, 2] . This means that the ®rst lease to be signed will stipulate a payment of á, which is the expectation of áë when ë is unknown. We assume that all participants in the market have access both to the terms of any occupancy agreement between a landlord and tenant, as well as the actual level of payoff that an occupied unit gives rise to. These payoffs are realised and observed immediately after occupancy and before the next period begins. This implies that ë becomes public knowledge in the period after the ®rst occupancy. The observation of the amount the ®rst tenant pays will reveal the tenant's á type, while the observation of the payoff will reveal the product áë and therefore pin down the market type. Subsequent tenants then pay áë. Finally, we initially assume that there is no recall, so that landlords have only one chance to lease to each potential tenant. The case with recall is taken up in Section 4.
In order for the model to be interesting W must be small enough that owners ®nd it pro®table to search for retail tenants when ë is unknown. We assume that an owner would prefer search even if the owner were the only one searching. Solving the single-agent search problem leads to the bound
where x P [0, 1] is the solution to x ä(1 x 2 )a2. Note that the presence of other searchers will only make search more pro®table, so this is a suf®cient condition that works for all parameter values.
The informational assumptions in the model imply that the market passes through two phases. In the ®rst phase before any units have occupants, there is no information on the market type, and the owners must simply decide on an acceptance strategy: which á types to permit to take occupancy. The second phase begins in the period immediately after the ®rst occupant has taken up residency, and involves a known value of ë. In this phase, there is a twofold decision facing the owners of vacant units. First, given the new information on ë, is it best to continue searching or to collect W ? Second, if search is best, which á types should be permitted to take occupancy at cost áë (the ex post value to an á-type)?
In looking to the model for an answer to these questions, we limit attention to equilibria in Markov strategies in which the decision rules of each agent depend only on information that is directly payoff relevant. In this case a strategy for an individual owner is a set of acceptable á types in the uninformed phase, a set of ë values that warrant continued search through potential occupants, and a set of acceptable á types corresponding to those values of ë that imply continued search. Given the information externality, the optimal strategies are interdependent, and we look for a symmetric Nash equilibrium. 6 The simple nature of the search framework leads to simple strategies. It is clear that any stationary equilibrium will involve cutoff rules: a reservation type U in the uninformed phase, a cutoff level ë, and a reservation type I (ë) in the informed phase contingent on the realised value of ë. The Nash equilibrium condition is that all decisions must be optimal given that others are using the same decision rules. We summarise this equilibrium below. 6 There may also be asymmetric equilibria to our model as in King (1995) . 7 Note that this de®nition of equilibrium applies only to values of W low enough to ensure that search is worthwhile in the uninformed phase.
(a) In the uninformed phase with ë unknown, the landlord accepts the occupancy of any tenant of type á > U upon payment of á, and rejects potential tenants with á , U . (b) In the informed phase in which ë is known, the landlord uses the property for of®ce space if ë , ë, and searches for a retail tenant if ë > ë. When searching, the landlord accepts any tenant of type á > I (ë) upon payment of áë and rejects potential tenants with á , I (ë).
The main lines of a demonstration of existence and uniqueness of this equilibrium are presented in Section 3.1, and a qualitative analysis is provided in Section 3.2. For a formal analysis of these topics see Caplin and Leahy (1993b) .
Model Solution and Properties

The Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
We solve the model backwards beginning with the informed phase. Once ë is known there is no longer any strategic interaction among the landlords. The problem of searching for the appropriate retail tenant reduces to a standard, single-agent search problem. Let V (á, ë) denote the value of an optimal strategy for an informed owner who is visited by a potential tenant of type á and knows that the market type is ë. The Bellman equation for this problem is,
The ®rst term inside the maximisation is the present value of renting to the tenant at hand. The second term is the discounted value of searching for another tenant. It follows immediately that there exists a reservation level of á, I (ë), and that
The left-hand side of (1) is the value of accepting the reservation type, whereas the centre and right-hand side are the expected value of rejecting this type in hope that a higher type will show up in the future. Equation (1) shows that I (ë) is independent of ë, I (ë) I . This independence arises from the multiplicative interaction between á and ë, which implies that the return to renting and searching are proportional to ë. Note also that I is an increasing function of the discount rate and has range (0, 1). Search will only take place in the informed state if the value of search, which equals V (á, ë)dá, exceeds W . This pins down the cutoff ë.
where we introduce w W a(1 I 2 ), to ease notation. Note that the upper bound on W implies ë , 1 and w < 1a2.
Using (1) and (2) we can integrate over the possible values of ë to derive the unconditional expectation of the value of being informed:
This simple solution for the optimal strategy in the informed phase makes it easy to solve for the optimal strategy in the uninformed phase. Let V U (á) denote the value of an optimal strategy for an uninformed landlord who is visited by a potential tenant of type á. Standard reasoning implies,
where p is the probability that the landlord who waits will remain uninformed and EV U and EV I denote the expected value of being uninformed and informed respectively. Again, the optimal strategy is for each owner to keep searching for tenants until they meet a tenant with type á > U , where U satis®es the indifference condition
Given U, we can pin down the other unknowns in the model. First, the probability that the landlord remains uninformed is the probability that all other landlords will reject their tenants. Since we are looking for symmetric equilibria, p U N À1 . Second, it is easy to show that EV U (1 U 2 )a2. Substituting these into (4) and using (1) to eliminate ä and (3) to eliminate EV I gives us an expression for U in terms of I :
This is the equation that will be the focus of the analysis.
PROPOSITION 1: For any data N > 2, ä P (0, 1) and W P (0, (1 I 2 )a2), de®ne I as the unique solution to (1) with I P (0, 1) and w W a(1 I 2 ). There exists a unique equilibrium of the form given in De®nition 1, with I (ë) I , ë 2w, and U P (I , min [1, (1 w 2 )I ]) uniquely determined by (5).
Properties of the Equilibrium
Proposition 1 indicates that the model conforms to the experience of Sixth Avenue. It is easy to see that U . I . This follows because the only difference between search in the two states is the possibility of becoming informed. If p were equal to zero then U would equal I , but p . 0 provides an added incentive to wait. The fact that landlords are more selective during the uninformed phase tends to increase the time until the ®rst unit is occupied relative to the time to ®ll subsequent vacancies. It is also easy to con®rm that, if the ®rst match is successful enough that other owners choose to search for retail tenants, then the expected rental rate increases. The expected lease payment in the uninformed phase is (1 U )a2. The expected payment in the
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informed phase given that ë . ë is (1 w)(1 I )a2. That the latter is greater follows from (4). 8 Rents rise due to the improvement in ë, in spite of the fact that less desirable á types may receive leases. Therefore, the model predicts the extended initial period of vacancies, and both the higher rents and the increased speed with which lots were ®lled once Bed Bath & Beyond succeeded.
The basic comparative static results of the model are intuitively clear. It is readily shown that the equilibrium level of U is strictly increasing in W. An increase in W raises EV I , the amount that an owner receives from waiting for the information to be revealed. This raises the payment needed to get an owner to commit to retail. Similarly an increase in N with U ®xed raises the probability that another owner will ®ll their vacancy this period. This increases the value of waiting for the information on the appropriate use of the property. Any force that increases the value of rejecting a current offer must by de®nition raise the minimum acceptable current offer, implying that U itself must rise with N.
The fact that U is increasing in N raises the question of how the expected waiting time until ®rst occupancy, 1a(1 À U N ), varies with N. If U were independent of N then we know that adding enough vacancies would ultimately raise the probability of the information escaping in the ®rst period to the limiting value of 1. It turns out, however, that it is indeed possible for delay to survive in the limit, as U (N ) rises toward 1 quickly enough to preserve a strictly positive probability that all vacancies remain un®lled. The result is summarised in Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2: The limiting value of U (N ) as N increases depends on the value of (1 w 2 )I :
There is a good economic reason for the importance of the product (1 w 2 )I in determining the nature of the free rider problem in large markets. It is readily con®rmed that (1 w 2 )I äEV I is the expected value of a vacant property in the next period should someone else's match reveal the true state today. If (1 w 2 )I . 1, there can be no equilibrium in which the information is practically guaranteed to come out, since this requires some landlord to accept an offer of no higher than one, while guaranteeing an expected payoff above one for anyone that turns down such an offer. This means that as the number of ®rms increases, the probability that each ®rm rejects a tenant must rise toward 1 fast enough to maintain aggregate uncertainty concerning whether someone else will accept an offer.
Proposition 2 shows how severe the free rider problem can become. Note that with w at its maximal value of 1a2,p approaches 1 as I increases to 1. What this means is that we can ®nd large markets in which the expected wait until ®rst occupancy, which heads toward 1a(1 Àp) as N increases, is arbitrarily long.
Recall that I is related to the discount rate ä by (1). Hence an I close to one implies a ä close to one. This suggests another experiment: we can think of an increase in ä as an increase in the search speed and ask what happens to the extent of delay as search becomes instantaneous. To address this question, ®x the discount rate ä in terms of a period of calendar time, for example one year. Suppose that a period in the model corresponds to a fraction 1an of a year. The discount rate for a period is therefore ä 1a n . As n heads to in®nity, the time between searches falls until search becomes effectively instantaneous. We saw above that in a large market if EV I . 1 the expected number of periods until the ®rst occupancy is 1a(1 Àp). Given n, this corresponds to 1a[n(1 Àp)] units of calender time. It is easy to show that as n heads to in®nity this delay approaches EV I aln ä, which is positive and ®nite. Again, the delay must be positive, since, if it were not, each agent would have an incentive to wait and act after learning the true state of the market.
Our ®nal experiment concerns the social optimality of the equilibrium of the model. It is straightforward to see that a social planner subject to the same information constraints as the private market will face a greater incentive to accept offers in the uninformed period. This is because the social planner will take into consideration the potential value of the information to other market participants. It is also intuitive that as N increases to in®nity the probability that some offer will be accepted in the ®rst period will rise to one since the social value of the information rises rapidly with N . In contrast with the rapid release of information in the social optimum, Proposition 2 shows that the private market equilibrium may result in delay even as N rises without bound.
Extensions
Recall in the Search Market
Barnes and Noble decided against taking a lease in 1991, but changed its mind once it saw the success of Bed Bath & Beyond. This suggests that recall may be an important option available to landlords. To allow for recall, we amend the model by assuming that in any period each landlord can both get a new offer and also recall any previous offer.
Let R denote the reservation type in the uninformed phase with recall. A landlord that meets a tenant of type R will be indifferent between leasing to this tenant and waiting until the next period. As before in a symmetric equilibrium the agent who does not accept will become informed with probability 1 À R N À1 , in which case the agent faces the choice of immediately
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accepting W or searching. Note that because R . I , if this agent searches in the informed state, the agent already has a satisfactory offer in hand. 9 The agent will therefore only meet one more tenant and choose between this tenant and the tenant of type R. The expected value of informed search is therefore ë(1 R 2 )a2, and informed search occurs only if ë . 2W a(1 R 2 ). The indifference condition that determines R is therefore:
The left hand side is the return to accepting the reservation type. The ®rst term on the right hand side represents the probability that the agent remains uninformed in the next period multiplied by the expected value of remaining uninformed, whereas the second represents the expected value if the information does become public multiplied by the probability of that event.
It is straightforward to show that (6) has a unique solution R P (U , 1), and that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which in the uninformed phase, any landlord accepts a type á tenant if and only if á > R. Once the information has been revealed, any landlord with maximal offer M > I allows in one more tenant and accepts the maximum offer, provided ë > 2W a(1 M 2 ) and otherwise sells immediately for W. For a searcher with maximal offer below I , the optimal strategy once the information has been revealed is identical to the optimal strategy in the case without recall.
The model with recall ®ts the timing of events on Sixth Avenue even better than the model without recall. Recall lengthens the time until ®rst occupancy and gives rise to a burst of activity following the ®rst success. Intuitively, recall matters in this setting because offers that would be unacceptable in the uninformed phase may become acceptable once the state of the market becomes known. The ability to come back to these offers makes the informed state more valuable than it would be in absence of recall, thereby increasing the minimum acceptable offer in the uninformed period. Given that R . U the time to ®rst occupancy is greater with recall. Given the backlog of acceptable offers, an initial success leads an immediate burst of completed deals.
Ownership Structure
A monopoly owner of all vacancies would be able to improve the functioning of the market radically by looking at the entire set of offers for the different units and accepting the best one. This would enable the monopolist to release the information early and reduce the amount of waste associated with committing units to the incorrect use. To understand the monopolist's optimal strategy, note that once the information has been released, the monopolist follows exactly the same strategy as the competitive market. The difference occurs in the uninformed phase. Provided that the monopolist accepts at least one offer in a period, (3) gives the expected value of any units that remain un®lled: äEV I (1 w 2 )I . Any offers above this should also be accepted. The only issue is therefore whether the maximum offer should still be accepted, even if it is below this level. The answer is yes if and only if the maximal offer exceeds some lower bound B. The entire issue of computing the monopoly optimum reduces to the identi®cation of B, and it is straightforward to show that B , I re¯ecting the value that the monopolist places on learning market information (Caplin and Leahy, 1993b) .
The monopoly optimum also has very different comparative static properties from the competitive outcome. Consider the effects of an increase in the value of of®ce space W, with ä and N ®xed. In economic terms, this makes the information on ë more valuable, since the alternative is more attractive. As we have seen, this makes competitive private agents less willing to accept an offer in the uninformed phase, since they are made to give up an increasingly valuable option. But for the monopolist, the increased value of all vacant units makes it more important to release information early so that the proper use can be found for the vacancies. This suggests that an increase in W should lower B, and this is indeed the case.
It is not surprising that where information externalities are important, there are certain advantages to monopoly ownership. The shopping malls that have sprung up in so many places indicate that these incentives have not gone unnoticed in the market. The case with competitive owners appears more likely to characterise areas that are long established and have seen multiple uses, such as Sixth Avenue. In complex urban settings, the nature of the correlations between payoffs at different locations changes over time, and so the relevant peer group also changes. This means that without monopoly ownership of the entire city, it is very likely that any new developments will cut across units that have different owners. This does not mean that there will not be efforts at consolidation and take-over once the common interest is noticed, but there is no evidence that such a process can take place without itself involving the expenditure of considerable time and effort, especially if hold-up problems arise. Even without common ownership, the various landlords may write contracts with side payments aimed at improving asset allocation in the spirit of Coase. However this may be, the model points to the importance of ownership structure in determining the speed with which large numbers of vacant spaces get ®lled up.
Information and Payoff Structure
There are several conceptually straightforward amendments to the model that would reduce the extent of the information externality without fundamentally changing the message. If the payoffs at the various locations were less than perfectly correlated, then there would be less to be gained by waiting for another store's results. If there was a smaller cost of switching the unit among its various uses, then the loss caused by an incorrect decision would fall, and this would also reduce the free rider problem. In addition, allowing for landlord heterogeneity may greatly reduce the extent of the free rider problem in large markets.
There are other changes that may operate to worsen the problem. One of these is the additional externality introduced when there are crowd spillover effects. As we show in the next subsection, this also tends to give rise to a suboptimal delay in ®lling the ®rst vacant unit. Another such change would involve endogenising the extent of the search effort. In this case the presence of other searches would slow down the privately optimal search speed. Information is a public good and would be underprovided by private agents. The reduction in search speed would add another force tending to delay information relevation, especially in large markets.
Another set of issues arise in considering changes in the information structure. There are many ways to change the information¯ow that all end up reducing the extent of the learning that takes place from a single observation of a store's success. One way to assure this is to make the reasonable assumption that observations of rents and pro®tability are highly noisy. One could also imagine changing the structure of information and the protocol in individual bargains in a manner that would impede the¯ow of information among agents. While these amendments should be expected to reduce the discontinuity in market outcomes, there is little reason to believe that this would change the fundamental form of the externality.
Crowd Effects
We now amend the model to allow for crowd spillover effects. To keep things simple, we get rid of the information spillover. To capture the crowd effects in the simplest possible manner, we assume that the payoff to an á type in any period is á(1 À ä) while there are no other units occupied, and rises to ëá(1 À ä) per period as soon as there is a single other unit occupied, with ë . 1. This means that one store alone does not draw the crowd, but that the presence of two stores draws in the whole crowd. In all other respects we retain an identical model structure, although there is no role for the outside option W.
In this framework just as in the model of information spillovers, there is a two phase market history, with a reservation type C with no other units occupied, and I once one or more unit is occupied. The model is identical to the information model in the second phase, so that the second cutoff is the familiar value of I identi®ed in (1) above.
To calculate C we use the condition for indifference between acceptance and rejection. Note that both of these values are endogenous to the model and depend on the equilibrium strategies themselves. To see how much to charge an á type with no other occupants in place, the landlord must compute the expected present value of occupancy for this á type: it will be above á but below áë. The expected surplus to an á type who takes occupancy in a period with no prior occupants depends both on the probability that some other unit gets occupied in this period, and the probability that units get occupied in subsequent periods. Hence the value depends on both C and I : the value can be written as áK (C, I ), where a little algebra shows,
A little further manipulation yields the indifference condition as between accepting and rejecting the offer when no units are occupied as,
Together (7) and (8) determine C and K . It is straightforward to establish that an equilibrium exists, and that any solutions satisfy C . I , so that owners are more selective when the market is small, and K (1 C) , ë(1 I ), so that rents rise with market size. This means that the crowd story ®ts many of the same qualitative aspects. In particular, early entry encourages later entry. There is, however, a big difference, in that the crowd effect is in many ways less strong. In economic terms the reason for this is that the cost of leading is far higher in the model of information externalities, in which entry may be a permanent mistake. One re¯ection of this difference between the information model and the crowd model is shown by considering what happens as the number of vacancies grows. In contrast to the information story, in the crowd story one can show that in large markets as N heads to in®nity, any sequence of equilibria C(N ) falls toward I . The reason for this is that with crowd spillovers, the more you trust someone else to accept a tenant, the more you wish to accept a tenant yourself. In a large market, if all tenants of type á > I are accepted in the ®rst period, then it is practically guaranteed that there will be a crowd right away. There is no need to wait. The more general issue is that while a large number of players may help to resolve the crowd externality problem, large numbers play a less essential role in resolving informational problems. In the information model, the fact that another landlord is accepting a tenant encourages delay, so that the acceptance decisions of distinct landlords are stategic substitutes. In the crowd story they are strategic complements.
Conclusions
We have developed a theory of search with information externalities, and have shown how this may help account for the regeneration of Sixth Avenue in the middle of a recession. In qualitative terms, the key assumption is that the ®rst store that makes the costly decision to locate must do so without knowing the level of some market risk, and that their act of locating will help to reveal this to those who have waited. The end result is an incentive for all to free ride off the decisions of someone more anxious to locate than themselves.
We feel that similar forces are at work in the many markets in which there are changes over time in the optimal pattern of usage of given resources, and in which there are costs of moving the resources between uses. This makes it important to explore the applicability of analogous frameworks in the labour market and the capital market as well as the property market. At an even broader level, the model points to the importance of learning from the actions of others in the process of search and adjustment. We have argued elsewhere that such patterns of learning are pervasive in many markets (Caplin and Leahy, 1995) , and we are actively exploring these issues in a variety of different settings.
New York University
Boston University Date of receipt of ®rst submission: September 1995 Date of receipt of ®nal typescript: February 1997
